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Abstract Rapid technological advancements can make
previously uneconomic resources and/or feedstock avail-
able within significantly reduced timeframes. This can and
will further transform the global energy landscape and
moreover, will impact the mix of feedstock we use for
energy provision and material production—the so-called
Feedstock Curve. Herein, three current examples are
assessed to illustrate that this restructuring has by far wider
reaching implications: Firstly, we examine how uncon-
ventional resources—mainly produced using fractured
cracking techniques—have restructured the US energy
landscape, are now fueling the US economic recovery and
will impact the geopolitical balance. Secondly, we assess
how unconventional resources could impact European
energy security, the Crimean crisis and redirect global cash
flows. Thirdly, we analyse the potential impact of so-called
methane hydrates deposited off the shores of Japan on the
energy transition of the Island nation and how they might
impact its trade deficit and long-term economic outlook.
Last but not least, we will present arguments that uncon-
ventional resources, when regulated properly, may be a
blessing for the environment. With these examples, this
think piece and concept note will illustrate the intercon-
nectedness of economics, politics, environmental conser-
vation and technology.
Keywords Energy security  Foreign policy 
International security  Resources  Global change
Introduction
Not long ago, anyone who had mentioned that the United
States would likely become energy independent or would
have said that they could consider exporting fossil resources
would have received roaring laughter. The energy market in
North America has, however, undergone a full transforma-
tion and neither energy independence nor the US as a fuel
exporting country is an unrealistic assumption [1]. Novel
feedstock such as shale gas and tight oil are impacting the
resource mix or as we coin it—the Feedstock Curve. Why
Feedstock Curve? Because these novel fossil resources do
not only impact the energy sector but also the petrochemical
industries as they are their critical feedstock.
Main fossil fuel resources used to date were so-called
conventional resources, meanwhile substantial amounts of
unconventional resources are adding to the feedstock curve.
For a detailed discussion of resources grades, we refer to a
previous publication [2]. Conventional reserves are the most
accessible and least technically challenging to bring into
production; they require relatively little capital and energy
investments for production and hence are the most profitable
resources. Most of the remaining conventional oil and gas
reserves are located in Russia and the Middle East. In con-
trast, unconventional reserves are not readily recovered
because they are deposited within rock formations, such as
shale gas and tight oil, or are combined with sand as in case of
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oil sands. Technology such as fractured cracking (fracking)
of rock formations or extraction of oil from oil sands is
required to produce the resource; however, the technology
requires significant upfront investments while production
requires significant supplementary energy [3]. Conse-
quently, unconventionals have a considerably higher pro-
duction cost, deliver less net energy [4] and cause more
greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, significant amounts of these
resources are located in the Western World!
One of the authors has previously reported on the
decline of conventional reserves; unconventional reserves
are likely to mitigate shortcomings in conventional pro-
duction but are only economic at sustained, high resource
prices. Especially in North America, this novel feedstock
has had and will remain to have a significant impact on
macroeconomics, trade balances and energy security and,
consequently, the North American economic outlook as
well as competitiveness. We hereafter analyse illustrative
cases in order to draw a picture of the potential impact of
conventional resources.
Analysis
North America and the energy transformation
In order to illustrate the importance of unconventional
resources for supply security, we will hereafter assess the
impact and the prospects for the United States, the country
most impacted by the transition of the Feedstock Curve.
We base our assessment on estimates of the US Govern-
ment’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) [5], the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) as well as the Census Bureau [6].
Unconventional Gas: For decades the United States was
dependent on imports of natural gas, historically in gaseous
form and more recently, approximately since 1985, also in
form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). While diversified
supply of natural gas and oil from abroad ensured US energy
security, it obviously came with cash transfers abroad and
consequently detrimentally affected the trade balance [7]. At
the height of import dependence, the United States imported
well over four trillion cubic feet (tcf); however, imports have
dropped below 3 tcf, while domestic production of natural
gas has risen to more than 8 tcf [8] per annum. The enabler
of this shift in supply is a combination of technological
advancements such as horizontal drilling, fractured cracking
of shale rock and advanced chemicals that allow cracking of
shale under relatively benign conditions [9]. This enabler
had the mentioned transformative impact of the American
feedstock curve and is likely to continue to have a significant
impact. Figure 1 depicts estimates by the EIA that conclude
that domestic gas production will continue to rise—albeit at
a slower rate—and imports will reduce to negligible
amounts before 2020. This assumptions is supported by the
fact that in the US degasification terminals for LNG are
being refitted to be liquefaction units as the shale gas boom
is continuing to affect the feedstock so drastically that sur-
plus of gas rather than shortages are expected. For instance,
Cheniere Energy decided to entirely alter the purpose of
their LNG terminals and refit them to liquefaction rather
than regasification units [10], a decision well supported by
data displayed in Fig. 1.
What has spurred this drastic restructuring of the US
situation? Technological advancements, for instance
fracking and horizontal drilling, allow unconventional gas
reserves to be released from soft rock such as shale and
sandstone, vide supra. Already today, more than 50 % of
the US’ natural gas production stem from unconventional
wells, such as shale and tight gas wells, by 2040 more than
75 % will come from unconventionals [11]. Figure 2
illustrates how unconventional (domestic) gas forces con-
ventional (imported) gas out of the feedstock curve.
The increased shale gas production has a beneficial
effect as it is expected that the long-term volume of natural
Fig. 1 US production and imports of natural gas in tcf; data taken
from EIA (footnote)
Fig. 2 Forecasted natural gas consumption by type (conventional vs.
unconventional); data from the EIA [11]
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gas liquids (NGLs). These are the more important feed-
stock for the (petro-)chemical industry [12] as they have
many values beyond their ability to produce heat, i.e. the
calorific value and are hence very valuable for the chemical
industries [13]. The production of NGLs is, however,
uncertain as it will vary considerably with the so-called
wetness of the natural gas produced. In 2013, Troner
estimated that NGL production could amount to 1.5–1.8
million barrels per day (mbd) [14].
While this is excellent news for the recovery of the
American economy, many claim that it is bad news for the
environment as production of unconventional reserves has
significant environmental externalities as it can impact
water supply as well as purity (1) [15] and is likely to be
more emission intense than conventional natural gas (2)
[16]. While both issues are valid concerns when utilising
these resources, they are not insurmountable: Firstly, water
impact can be mitigated by technological improvement
which can be driven by regulation and hence, this should
be relatively straightforward to solve. Secondly, while
more emission intense, unconventionals can crowd out coal
which will lead to an overall reduction of greenhouse-gas
emissions. An approximation by the International Energy
Agency (IEA) suggests that the greenhouse-gas emissions
caused by unconventional gas are half those of coal (cal-
culated in gCO2(eq)/kWh) [17]. Consequently, overall
emissions are likely to be reduced significantly if uncon-
ventional gas crowds out coal. Indeed, the EIA assessed a
sustained decline in US greenhouse gas emission since
2010 while the national economy is growing at several %
annually [18].
But is this happening? Is the reduction really due to a
crowding out of coal? In order to assess whether is
crowding out is indeed happening, we look at the imports
and exports of coal from and to the US as well as domestic
coal production after 2007, when the shale gas boom really
took off (Fig. 3). From this graph it can be seen that coal
imports have fallen to negligible levels from 2007 onwards,
while exports have almost tripled during the same period.
Overall production on the other hand declined by one-
third! Figure 3 depicts the exports and imports of coal to/
from the United States as well as domestic production.
From this graph it can be clearly seen that coal is leaving
the feedstock curve in the US, most likely crowded out by
cheap shale gas. A global shale gas boom could therefore
indeed lead to a crowding out of most pollution energy
sources such as coal. However, utilising these resources
will not be as straightforward in other regions of the world
owing to differences in legal frameworks (see below) and
geological circumstances (see ‘‘Shale gas and the rest of
the world’’).
Due to different property rights, utilising shale gas will
be much more challenging in other parts of the world, e.g.
the European Union. For instance, in the United States
resources beneath your land are considered your property
which gives a private or legal person a clear incentive to
produce these or sell the rights for production [19]. In the
EU, resources are a common good and hence belong to the
government which leads to a clear incentive to oppose
techniques such as fracking below your property as they
could pose a risk for both real estate and value of premises.
However, the IEA estimates that the EU has more than
600 tcf of unconventional gas reserves, which could act as
a terrific back-up fuel to balance out intermittency of re-
newables and/or assisting the transition away from nuclear
power. However, analogue to the negative public percep-
tion of nuclear power, unconventional resources encounter
scepticism from the environmentally conscious European
public. Recent happenings in Eastern Europe, however,
could drastically alter public perception, see ‘‘Europe, the
Loss of Resources, and the Renewed Power Struggle’’.
Unconventional Oil: Even more important for the US
economy is—of course—the most precious fossil fuel
resource, oil. American oil production has peaked in the
1960s [20] and endeavours to increase energy security
using bio-based or synthetic fuels have essentially failed
[21, 22].
In case of oil, the ‘‘unconventional revolution’’ trans-
formation has not yet taken place, but it is likely that so-
called tight oil will play a crucial role in the continued
transformation of the feedstock curve. Tight oil is—ana-
logue to shale gas—conventional oil that is trapped in soft
stone formations and can be produced using fracking
techniques. Also here, technology transformed uneco-
nomical and inaccessible resources into viable feedstock
within years. Tight oil is pushing current US oil production
past 10 mbd reducing the need for imports from 60 % in
2005 to 40 % in 2012 (Fig. 4). Forecasts by the EIA
assume that by 2016 the need for imports will be reduced to
25 %. Especially with crude oil prices sustained over $100
[23], this will have very positive effects on the US trade
Fig. 3 US coal production, imports and exports
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balance and hence economic outlook, vide infra. Moreover,
this has wide ranging political implications as most of these
imports could come from neighbouring Canada and Mex-
ico both friendly to the US and dependent on revenues
from resource exports [24]. At present US military pre-
sence not only provides stability to the Middle East but US
forces are also key in policing critical trade routes. Will the
need for this presence and the associated cost persist or will
the US reconsider? This issue will be considered in a later
section of this think piece.
Resource imports, trade balances and macroeconomics
For more than a decade, the US has borrowed money,
mainly from China, in order to transfer it to resource-
exporting states to satisfy its domestic resource hunger. A
significant proportion of this resource demand is due to a
notoriously inefficient car fleet. Will this affect the long-
term economic outlook?
There is no short answer to this very important question,
nor is there one correct answer. Many academics and
policymakers have expressed grave concerns about the
widening US trade deficit and the consequently increasing
foreign debt, however, there is a lot of disagreement about
the severity of the problem and the potential consequences
[25]. The United States have had trade deficits for most
years in the last 3 decades, which led to negative balance of
payments and subsequently to a very significant foreign
debt. This works as long as there are sufficient foreign
investors (mainly governments) that lend the US money,
but should these sources run dry, the US might pay dearly
[26]. Credit ratings of the US Government have already
been reduced by most rating agencies, initially by Standard
& Poor’s in late 2011 [27]. A heavy debt burden can
hamper economic growth as governments have less finan-
cial resources for stimulating innovation and economic
growth [28]. Hence, the foreign debt of the US creates risk
and uncertainty for its long-term economic outlook as it’s
likely to hamper or redirect foreign direct investments.
However, the Council on Diplomatic Relations estimates
that recently roughly 50 % of the US trade deficit was due
to just oil [29]. The narrowing of the differential between
consumption and production of oil as well as gas, vide
supra, will hence reduce the trade deficit, ease balance of
payment issues and consequently will affect foreign debt
and credit rating of the United States [30]. All this will thus
free up resources to stimulate the American economy and
hence, technological advancements in unconventional
resource production not only transformed the feedstock
curve and hence the energy landscape, but are also likely to
fuel US economic recovery. One of the authors has pre-
viously outlined that advanced economies are indeed able
to translate resource wealth into economic growth and
innovation without suffering from the so-called resources
or carbon curse [31]. The US were already able to become
the worldwide leading economy based on conventional
resource wealth post WWII and are likely to transform this
newly gained, unconventional resource wealth in a similar
manner. Innovation in fuel production has therefore clearly
had an impact on the energy landscape, domestic green-
house-gas emissions and the long-term economic outlook.
Will this success be transferable to other areas of the world
and what are the political consequences of this transition?
These issues will be explored in the second part of this
think piece.
Shale gas and the rest of the world
Unconventional fossil fuel reserves are not an American
phenomenon, many regions of the world have significant
reserves of shale gas and tight oil [32]. Figure 5 gives an
overview over shale gas reserves as an example of abun-
dant unconventionals: In South America reserves are
mainly located in Argentina and Brazil, the two largest
countries on this continent, while in North America the
reserves are spread out fairly evenly over Mexico, the US
and Canada. In Asia, shale gas reserves are centered in
China and in Australia within Australasia.
The Chinese shale gas reserves are significant, approx-
imately twice the size the reserves the US have at hand
[33]. Since energy security is very high on the Chinese
political agenda and air pollution could be reduced by
replacing coal with clean-burning natural gas, utilization of
unconventional gas is a no-brainer for China. However, the
Chinese resources have proven to be more difficult to
produce than US reserves which has delayed production.
Ultimately, however, China will tap into these resources as
energy security and economic concerns will be major
driving forces; for these reasons China even acquired
Fig. 4 US oil production and consumption, a gap that widened over
decades is now narrowing again
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companies with specific know-how in shale gas production
[34].
Also Europe has shale-gas reserves albeit significantly
smaller than the larger continents, and at the same time
the countries with the greatest endowments, France and
Poland, are both reluctant to produce—in fact France has
even banned exploration of shale gas [35]. A critical
obstacle preventing deployment on shale gas in Europe is
public perception of the environmental risks posed by
unconventionals production. However, many European
countries have stringent targets for decarbonisation and,
analogue to the US, gas can crowd out coal thereby
reducing carbon emissions [36]. Moreover, European
shale gas causes fewer emissions than natural gas from
outside the EU, imported via LNG terminals or pipelines,
mainly because of emissions from liquefaction and rega-
sification or long-distance gas transport [37]. These are
two very strong arguments for shale gas utilization,
another strong argument is to come! A drawback of shale
gas is that the potentially cheap source of energy, might
pose a threat to the significant investments renewable
energy requires (crowding out). On the other hand natural
gas, due to its flexibility, can supplement the transfor-
mation of the energy landscape. Gas-fired power plants
are very flexible as they can easily be powered up and
down and could therefore provide a suitable backup
needed to cope with intermittent power supply from solar
and wind sources. It will be important to smartly incen-
tivize the energy transition in order to balance renewables
and gas to gain maximum benefits for both the climate
and the economy.
Europe, the loss of resources, and the renewed power
struggle
The current situation in the Ukraine and the consequently
rising tension between the east and west could, however,
draw public attention away from environmental issues
towards energy security concerns. At the moment, Europe
(especially Germany) is dependent on Russian gas: roughly
a third of the gas used in the OECD Europe is imported
from Russia [39] approximately the amount Norway, the
biggest domestic producer, provides. The de facto annex-
ation of the Crimean by the Russian Federation will deplete
the resource base Western Europe has easy access to,
detrimentally affecting its already weak energy security
and hence the Crimean question can be seen as the biggest
security crisis Europe had to face since the end of the Cold
War. The incorporation of the territory adjoining the Black
Sea into the Russian Federation will annex the rights to
resources located offshore in the Black Sea [40] and hence
these resources are moved into Russian dominated terri-
tory, away from the EU. There are two straightforward
solutions to the crisis: increasing domestic production of
natural gas or diversifying imports [41]. During the first
Ukrainian gas crisis in 2009, the EU has taken important
steps and increased the number of interconnectors for both
electricity and natural gas in order to increase its energy
Fig. 5 Estimation of technically recoverable global shale gas resources (in tcf) Source: US EIA, World Shale Gas [38]
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security and mitigate reliance on volatile regions in Eastern
Europe. However, in the meantime Nord Stream has gone
online [42] (in 2012 to be precise) and this has on the one
hand circumvented politically volatile regions but on the
other hand increased dependence on Russian gas! As
always, energy security is based on diversified supply of
different energy resources, however, this dogma is unlikely
to hold right now in Europe. Therefore, the EU has
expanded the capacity for gas storage and LNG regasifi-
cation since 2005; for instance, the regasification capacity
will raise almost four times between 2005 and 2015 from
2.5 tcf to 9.2 tcf per annum. This additional capacity will
reduce reliance on Russian gas if sufficient LNG, for
instance from the US, is on the market. Very recently, the
speaker of the US House, John Boehmer, stated that
expediting the approval to export natural gas to the EU in
order to mitigate the Union’s reliance on Russian gas was
one way to stand up to geopolitical aggression [43]. In such
a scenario, natural gas would be used as a strategic
weapon—a geopolitical weapon. Were this to happen and
effective, unconventionals and their production technology
would have directly geopolitical impact as they are likely
to reduce Russian influence in Western Europe! The EU
has meanwhile welcomed such measures, which would
intensify transatlantic relations [44, 45].
Asia and energy scarcity
In Asia, the energy situation has not undergone the radical
transformations North America has encountered and con-
sequently this area is still coping with relative energy
scarcity [46]. As a consequence, energy as well as resource
prices are comparatively high; in the case of natural gas for
instance, the Asian price can be almost an order of mag-
nitude higher than in North America, a phenomenon
referred to as Asian premium [47]. In order to assess the
Asian situation, we will herein assess the most extreme
case—Japan. The island nation is resource-poor and has
hence based its energy security policy on nuclear power in
order to be relatively independent of resource imports
(roughly 30 % of its electricity production had stemmed
from nuclear power). Unfortunately, Japan is also the most
earthquake-prone country in the world and the devastation
of a nuclear power plant in Fukushima in 2011 has had a
devastating impact on Japan and the perception of nuclear
power. After the disaster in Fukushima, the authorities
suspended nuclear power production pending a thorough
and comprehensive review of reactor security. It is antici-
pated that some reactors will go online again after being
cleared by the authorities; however, it is unlikely that
former levels of nuclear power production will be reached
in the foreseeable future. The restructuring of the Japanese
energy landscape in the aftermath of the Fukushima
disaster was neither straightforward nor cheap. One of the
main power (electricity) sources to replace nuclear gener-
ation is natural gas, which has to be bought at the men-
tioned Asian premium prices critically Japan’s economic
competitiveness. In Fig. 6, cost of natural gas imports into
Japan as well as the Japanese trade balance since 2010 are
depicted; from this illustration it can be seen that resource
imports after the Fukushima accident in March 2011
increased, and hence cash flows abroad. Coupled to these
cash flows out of Japan, the trade balance has for the first
time in decades shifted into the negative! As in case of the
US, the trade deficit directly affects balance of payments,
foreign debt and thus Japan’s long-term economic outlook.
In addition to this detrimental macroeconomic impact,
particularly industries that use natural gas as a feedstock
and are also energy-intensive are affected by imports of
pricy resources and rising energy prices as costs of two
input factors increase in a coupled manner. This additional
cost entering production prices in a twofold manner
directly affects competitiveness of companies located in
Japan compared to companies located in areas with lower
feedstock prices, such as those in the United States. Even
though Japan does not possess significant amounts of shale
gas, it has reasonable amounts of so-called methane
hydrates. Methane hydrates also known as frozen methane
or methane clathrate is methane trapped within a frozen
water crystal and is deposited in significant amounts on the
ground of deep waters off the Japanese shores. This
unconventional resource could potentially be a game
changer for Japan just as shale has changed the North
American energy landscape. Figure 7 maps the confirmed,
potential and possible methane hydrate reserves off Japan’s
shores: the Eastern Nankai trough contains confirmed
reserves of 500 billion cubic meters and it is estimated that
more than a trillion cubic meters, enough to satisfy Japan’s
natural gas needs for more than a decade. If Japan wants to
Fig. 6 Natural gas imports and trade balance, data from the OECD
[48] and the EIA [49]
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transition out of nuclear power, these unconventional gas
resources could be the perfect transition fuel. Moreover, it
is suggested that the actual reserves are five times as large
and could thus have a long-term impact on Japan’s energy
security and economic outlook [50].
If Japan could utilise this unconventional resource, the
macroeconomic implications would be as strong as in the
US: the current trade deficit could be shifted back to a trade
surplus, competitiveness with other regions of the world
could be restored through declining energy and feedstock
prices and last but not least, energy security could be
increased which would likely mitigate if not resolve ten-
sions with other Asian states—yet another geopolitical
impact of the restructuring of the feedstock curve. There
are, however, concerns about feasibility of these projects;
for instance, Japan’s food security is largely based on
maritime supply and hence any environmental damage in
relation to off-shore production of methane hydrates could
directly affect food security. Nevertheless, also here
unconventional feedstock and the transformation of the
feedstock curve could have significant political and eco-
nomic implications.
Discussion
Technological advancements in fossil fuel production
have—within a few years—altered the mix of resources we
utilize, the so-called feedstock curve. The transformation
of the feedstock curve has in turn had a drastic impact on
the macroeconomic outlook of, for instance, the United
States and could potentially affect other countries, like
Japan, in a similar manner. The United States, once the
biggest producer of petroleum, became highly dependent
on fuel imports, but has undergone an energy transforma-
tion and is meanwhile independent of natural gas imports
and is likely to become relatively independent of oil
imports. Hence, the technological advancements that
enabled the production of unconventional resources, have
had significant macroeconomic impact as they are likely to
reduce the enormous trade deficit of the US and hence will
improve the country’s macroeconomic outlook. What
implications does this have for geopolitics? As an example,
the United States is policing the seven global oil choke-
points [51] and provides stability to the Middle East
through diplomatic channels and military presence. Will
this continue when the US only has to import relatively
minor amounts of petroleum which are likely to come from
Canada, Mexico and Venezuela? Will they continue to
sustain a costly presence in the Middle East when Saudi oil
supply is not critical for economic survivals anymore? On
first glance this would seem that this would not make sense
when most oil is domestically produced or imported from
adjacent countries, but the US will still want to keep oil
prices at least relatively low and since oil is a globally
traded commodity, undisrupted trade will be key to ensure
equilibrium prices [52]. Therefore, the US is unlikely to
abandon the security arena for oil, but it is debatable if they
will continue to be involved in the current manner. Import
dependent countries such as China will be expected to
contribute their fair share to naval security. These issues
have to be carefully as well as holistically dealt by energy
analysts.
Russia’s renewed imperial ambitions are fuelled by
fossil resources: almost a billion dollars is transferred to
Russia daily for fossil fuel exports and Putin’s confidence
is growing with every dollar. Especially Europe is
dependent on these exports and Russia is sure to have a
tight grip on Europe, the current happenings in Eastern
Europe are clear signs of this. Through ample gas pro-
duction in the US and the potential of EU shale gas pro-
duction, the West could strike back by intensifying
transatlantic bonds and gaining independence of imports
from the East. After all Russia is as dependent on foreign
currency as we are dependent on fossil fuel imports and
when cash flows change directions from East to West,
many in Russia will be mighty disappointed. Moreover,
the increasing energy independence is providing the US
with a confidence boost, coined ‘barrels of confidence’ by
Lee and Lahn [53].
Looking at the issue from the resource-rich countries’
point of view is interesting as well: the US shale gas boom
has kept gas prices in North America relatively low
Fig. 7 Confirmed, potential and possible methane hydrate (MH)
reserves
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compared to Europe and Asia, simultaneously reducing the
amount of LNG imports needed. In a similar fashion, tight
oil coming online will affect—most likely stabilize—oil
prices. For countries relying on resource exports for eco-
nomic stability, i.e. countries suffering from the resource
curse, the shifting feedstock curve should be the final
wake-up call: For how long will resource exports manage
to finance their political systems? Should the resource
wealth be immediately invested in innovation and tech-
nology to set these countries on course for a post-resource
area? Will unconventional production just be a temporary
phenomenon as carbon emission and climate change con-
cerns will impact political agendas so that the resources
have to be abandoned? These are critical question gov-
ernmental strategists have to tackle.
Assessing how things will develop over the coming
years is already tricky, but how will all this pan out in the
long term? It is tough to forecast how this situation will
develop as political, economic and technological issues
interact in a highly complex manner. The uncertainty of the
three factors listed above is so large that it is hard to predict
what will power us in a decade’s time. Will unconven-
tionals really crowd out renewable energy or will uncon-
ventional gas power the transition to a renewable energy
system? Will emerging technologies in battery and grid
storage make gas backup for renewables unnecessary?
Another tough call to make as technological developments
can disrupt complete industries within a few years. More-
over, emerging technologies can—within years—impact
the amount of energy we use and hence there is not only
significant uncertainty around the resources we will utilise
but also the amount of energy we demand to ensure a
smooth functioning of the globalised economy. The only
thing that is certain is that in 2010 we utilised 334 exo joule
of nuclear, fossil and renewable energy (Fig. 8), how
energy demand will evolve or which resource will be in
demand is highly uncertain. Moreover, will cheap uncon-
ventional resources crowd out renewables or high-emis-
sions resource out of the feedstock curve? Also this is
highly uncertain and therefore the environmental impact of
unconventionals.
Resources have always had a tremendous impact on
geopolitics, but resource accessibility by technological
advancements has made this mix so volatile that tide turns
very quickly and with wide ranging consequences. This is
why the feedstock curve has to be monitored closely in
collaboration with businesses, public officials and inde-
pendent researchers to gain a clear view of how it affects
international economics as well as geopolitics. Due to
multiple, often coupled, uncertainties, predictions only
make sense over a few years and consequently have to be
continuously reassessed.
Conclusions
Unconventional resources will continue to restructure the
energy landscape as well as the feedstock curve and they
will be critical for the recovery of the global economy.
Economic and political factors are driving the exploration
of unconventional fuel resources which can provide energy
security, while financial considerations push technological
frontiers in resource production.
The provision of energy security has risen to the top of
the political agenda due to renewed geopolitical tensions in
Eastern Europe and the far East Asia as well as economic
necessity due to large trade deficits of advanced economies
which could lead to a long-term instability of the global-
ized economy.
Production of unconventionals could indeed have a
detrimental effect on the environment by increasing
greenhouse-gas emissions, impacting water and crowding
out investment in renewables. When carefully regulated,
impact on water could be minimized while greenhouse gas
emissions would be reduced when unconventional gas
crowds out coal and provides efficient backup for renew-
able power. Implementation of smart policies will be crit-
ical to ensure that these resources are not only a winner for
politics and economics but also for the environment.
Moreover, we have to extend our assessments: at the
moment, we carefully forecast energy demand and assess
potential resources that could be used to supply this
demand. Nevertheless, the ICT revolution has made tech-
nological progress both fast and volatile so that we have to
use ‘intelligence’ and assess lab-stage technologies with
regards to their potential impact on both energy supply and
demand.
Resources and the energy security they provide have
often not only impacted the economic success of countries
but also the geopolitical balance of power, the renewed
power struggle in Eastern Europe is clearly a sign of this
trend. It has to be closely monitored how the technological
Fig. 8 Global energy demand and uncertainty around the feedstock
utilised
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redistribution of fossil resources will impact issues such as
tensions between Japan and China, the reoccurring conflict
in the Middle East as well as the renewed power struggle
between East and West.
Collaborative endevours including acedemics, busi-
nesses and governmental agencies will be critical for
monitioring the feedstock curve and its potential impact on
the globalized economy.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original




2. Owen NA, Inderwildi OR, King DA (2010) The status of con-
ventional world oil reserves—hype or cause for concern? Energy
Policy 38(8):4743–4749
3. Hall CAS, Lambert JG, Balogh SB (2014) EROI of different fuels
and the implications for society. Energy Policy 64:141–152
4. Hall CAS, Klitgaard KA (2012) Energy and the wealth of nations.
Springer, Berlin
5. US Governments, Energy Information Administration, Wash-
ington D.C., USA
6. US Department of Commerce, US Census Bureau, https://www.
census.gov/, Washington D.C., USA
7. US Department of Commerce, US Census Bureau, https://www.







12. Speight JG (2010) The refinery of the future. William Andrew,
London
13. Hashiguchi BG et al (2014) Science 343(6176):1232–1237
14. Troner A (2013) Natural gas liquids in the shale revolution. Baker
Institute, Rive University http://bakerinstitute.org/files/3961/
download/
15. Brantley SL et al (2013) Water resource impacts during uncon-
ventional shale gas development: The Pennsylvania experience.
Int J Coal Geol. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.coal.2013.12.017
16. International Energy Agency (2013) Are we entering the golden









20. Inderwildi OR, King DA (2012) Energy, transport & the envi-
ronment. Springer, Berlin
21. Inderwildi OR, Jenkins SJ, King DA (2008) J Phys Chem C
112(5):1305–1307











28. Checherita-Westphal C, Rother P (2012) Eur Econ Rev 56(7):
1392–1405
29. Diplomatic Council on Energy Security http://www.secure
energy.org/sites/default/files/DCES-Oil-and-the-Trade-Deficit.
pdf
30. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (2013)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/pdf/text.pdf
31. Friedrichs J, Inderwildi O (2013) The carbon curse: are fuel rich




33. World Economic Forum (2013) Energy harnessing: new solutions







37. AEA Technology (2012) Climate impact of potential shale gas

















46. World Economic Forum (2013) Japanese Energy Transition.,
Tokyo Japan, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/IP/2014/CH/Japan_
Energy_Report_2014.pdf
47. Ken Koyama IEEJ (2012) A Japanese perspective on the inter-
national energy landscape http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/4252.pdf







52. World Economic Forum (2013) The Japanese energy transitions
53. Lee B, Lahn G (2014) Barrels of confidence. Prospect
Appl Petrochem Res (2014) 4:157–165 165
123
